Three years into one of the world’s deadliest conflicts, the United States is now going after the people making sure it stays well-staffed.
On April 17, 2026 — the grim third anniversary of Sudan’s civil war — the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) imposed sanctions on a Colombia-based network accused of recruiting and deploying former Colombian military veterans to fight alongside the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), the paramilitary group at the center of the conflict. The move targets five individuals and their associated companies, and it sends a pointed message: Washington isn’t just watching anymore.
Who’s Being Sanctioned — and Why
At the center of the network is Alvaro Andres Quijano Becerra, identified by Treasury as the main recruiting node for Colombian mercenaries supporting the RSF. His wife, Claudia Viviana Oliveros Forero, is also named, along with their companies International Services Agency (A4SI) and Fénix Human Resources S.A.S. Two additional figures round out the list: Jose Oscar Garcia Batte, operating through his firm Global Qowa Al-Basheria S.A.S. (GQAB), and Jose Libardo Quijano Torres. Together, Treasury alleges, they built a pipeline funneling experienced fighters into one of Africa’s most brutal war zones.
Hundreds of former Colombian military personnel have reportedly been deployed with the RSF since 2024, filling roles ranging from drone operators to trainers — including, disturbingly, trainers of child soldiers. That’s not a footnote. That’s a defining detail.
A War That Has Swallowed Everything
How bad is it? The numbers alone are staggering. The civil war between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the RSF, which erupted in April 2023, has killed more than 150,000 people — some estimates from rights groups put the toll even higher than the U.N.’s official count of roughly 40,000. More than 14 million people have been displaced. Famine conditions have taken hold across parts of the country. The RSF’s documented atrocities include targeted killings of civilians, ethnic violence, and sexual violence — acts for which OFAC had already sanctioned RSF commanders in prior rounds of penalties.
Last October, the RSF captured El Fasher after an 18-month siege, a fall accompanied by widespread reports of atrocities. The city had been one of the last major population centers in Darfur not under RSF control. Its fall was, by most accounts, catastrophic for civilians trapped inside.
“The RSF has shown again and again that it is willing to target civilians — including infants and young children,” said John K. Hurley, Under Secretary of the Treasury for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, in remarks cited following the announcement. “Its brutality has deepened the conflict and destabilized the region, creating the conditions for terrorist groups to grow.”
Treasury’s Broader Warning
Still, sanctions alone don’t stop a war. What Thursday’s action does signal, though, is that the U.S. is increasingly focused not just on the RSF’s leadership but on the infrastructure keeping the RSF operational — including foreign mercenary networks that give it trained manpower it might not otherwise have.
Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent was blunt about where responsibility lies. “It is unacceptable that the leaders of the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces have not committed to a humanitarian truce to address the devastating famine created by the civil war in Sudan,” he stated. “They must act to end this humanitarian crisis immediately.”
That message was sharpened further in a separate statement from Bessent, which left little ambiguity about the stakes: “The United States calls on the Rapid Support Forces to commit to a humanitarian ceasefire immediately. We will not tolerate this ongoing campaign of terror and senseless killing in Sudan. Without a swift end, Sudan’s civil war risks further destabilizing the region, creating conditions for terrorist groups to grow and threaten the safety and interests of the United States.”
Colombia’s Uncomfortable Role
There’s a particular irony — or perhaps a tragedy — in the Colombian dimension of this story. Colombia has spent decades trying to dismantle its own paramilitary culture, pouring enormous political and human capital into peace processes and military reform. That some of its most experienced veterans are now allegedly being funneled into a foreign civil war, fighting for a force accused of mass atrocities, is the kind of detail that tends to haunt policymakers on both ends.
It’s also not entirely new. Colombian ex-military fighters have previously appeared in conflicts in the Middle East and elsewhere — a pattern that speaks less to individual rogue actors and more to systemic gaps in how demobilized soldiers are absorbed back into civilian life. That said, the scale and specificity of this network — complete with incorporated companies, spousal involvement, and defined operational roles — suggests something more organized than opportunism.
What Comes Next
The sanctions freeze any U.S.-held assets belonging to the designated individuals and entities, and they prohibit Americans from doing business with them. They won’t end the war. They probably won’t even end the recruitment pipeline overnight. But they raise the cost of participation — and they put other potential intermediaries on notice that Washington is watching the supply chain, not just the battlefield.
Three years in, with more than 14 million people displaced and famine spreading, the question isn’t whether the international community has noticed Sudan’s catastrophe. It’s whether noticing — and sanctioning — will ever be enough.
